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SUMMARY Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) is a cryptographic
primitive that is based on physical property of each entity or Integrated
Circuit (IC) chip. It is expected that PUF be used in security applications
such as ID generation and authentication. Some responses from PUF are
unreliable, and they are usually discarded. In this paper, we propose a new
PUF-based authentication system that exploits information of unreliable
responses. In the proposed method, each response is categorized into
multiple classes by its unreliability evaluated by feeding the same challenges
several times. This authentication system is named Q-class authentication,
where Q is the number of classes. We perform experiments assuming a
challenge-response authentication system with a certain threshold of errors.
Considering 4-class separation for 4-1 Double Arbiter PUF, it is figured
out that the advantage of a legitimate prover against a clone is improved
form 24% to 36% in terms of success rate. In other words, it is possible
to improve the tolerance of machine-learning attack by using unreliable
information that was previously regarded disadvantageous to authentication
systems.
key words: Physically Unclonable Function, authentication, machine-
learning attack
1. Introduction
Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) has been studied
since its concept was proposed in [1], [2]. PUF’s output
is based on physical information that is generated in manu-
facturing process. Due to the nature of unclonability, PUF
has been increasing attention as a new cryptographic prim-
itive. PUFs are classified into two types; strong PUF and
weak PUF. Especially strong PUF, of which challenge space
is relatively large, is of great interest as it could be a key
component in authentication systems.
Arbiter PUF (APUF) is one of the strong PUFs. It
exploits the propagation time difference between two signal
paths in a circuit [3]. These two paths are determined by
sequential selector pairs that are controlled by challenge bits.
The propagation time difference is evaluated using a latch
or flip-flop called arbiter. As a result, one-bit output is
generated as response. It is experimentally verified that such
propagation time difference is unique between Integrated
Circuit (IC) chips because of unavoidable manufacturing
variation.
An obstacle for APUF is machine-learning (ML) at-
tack [4], [5]. In this attack, an attacker collects challenge-
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response pairs (CRPs), and makes a clone of the legitimate
PUF. To address this problem, n-XOR APUF, in which mul-
tiple APUF outputs are XORed, was proposed to improve
the attack tolerance in [6].
However, it is reported that even XOR APUF can be
cloned by using unreliable responses [7], [8]. The unreli-
ability of responses becomes valid information when mod-
eling APUF. An n-XOR APUF’s response is generated by
APUF’s responses, because it is tightly related to the propa-
gation time difference [8]. Moreover, if a response of APUF
is unstable, n-XOR APUF’s response also becomes unsta-
ble. In [7], the author applied the divide-and-conquer ML
attack to n-XOR APUF. More specifically, Covariance Ma-
trix Adaptation Evolution Strategy (CMA-ES) is used to find
a better model for each APUF one by one. It is worth men-
tioning that non-deterministic feature of CMA-ES improves
the accuracy of APUF model.
Meanwhile yet another APUF variant called double
APUF (DAPUF) was proposed in order to improve unique-
ness [9]. DAPUF combines multiple APUFs similarly to
n-XOR APUF but in a different way. DAPUF is also eval-
uated under the ML attack. In [10], the authors reported
that an attack on DAPUF using Deep Learning (DL) was
unsuccessful. However, they also reported that DAPUF has
a lot of unstable responses, which makes it unsuitable for
conventional authentication system. In summary, DAPUF is
advantageous in terms of resistance against ML attack, but
is more unstable compared to APUF and n-XOR APUF.
We address the above-mentioned disadvantage of DA-
PUF by proposing a new APUF-based authentication sys-
tem. That is inspired by a conventional technique for weak
PUF [11] in which the unreliable response is used as the
third value. Classification to three classes is not necessarily
appropriate for strong PUF because there is threat of ML
attack. In our proposed method, the number of classes is
increased. More specifically, unreliability of response is es-
timated by feeding the same challenges several times. Then
the response is categorized into multiple classes depending
on the estimated unreliability. This authentication system
is named Q-class authentication, where Q is the number of
classes. The results show that the proposed authentication
system using DAPUF increases the tolerance against DL,
and strengthens the prover’s advantage compared with the
conventional 2-class authentication system.
Copyright © 2018 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers
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Table 1 Notation.
Notation Explanation
T The number of trials
L Challenge-bit length in one trial of authentication
N The number of devices
bt, l The l-th response bit of the t-th trial (or device)
k The number of responses used in authentication system
U Uniqueness value
P Prediction rate
S Steadiness value
C Correctness value
R Randomness value
M Secure-Operation Margin
Q Total class number in authentication
mR The number to execute PUF in registration phase
mV The number to execute PUF in verification phase
rs The number of 1s in the raw responses when the PUF executed
mR (mV ) times
~c The challenge
cl The l-th challenge bit of the challenge of length i
D Maximum advantage of legitimate prover against clone
AP Prover’s success rate
AC Clone’s success rate
2. Related Work
2.1 Quantitative Metrics for PUF
Table 1 shows the notation in this paper. Correctness†,
uniqueness, and randomness are defined in [12]. Correct-
ness indicates response stability when the same challenge is
provided to a certain PUF. Let T be the number of trials, L
be the number of total challenges, i.e., challenge-bit length
in one trial of the authentication experiment, and N be the
number of devices. Correctness is defined with a response
bit as
C = 1 − 2
TL
T∑
t=2
L∑
l=1
(b1,l ⊕ bt,l). (1)
The ideal number of correctness is 1, and if the number of
correctness is 0, the PUF returns a random response.
Uniqueness indicates extent of responses difference
when inputting the same challenge to each PUF. Unique-
ness is expressed as
U =
4
NL
N∑
t=2
L∑
l=1
(b1,l ⊕ bt,l). (2)
When uniqueness is 0, all the PUFs return the same response.
Finally, randomness is claiming the ratio of 0 and 1 in
response bits. Randomness is expressed as the min-entropy
of binary probability distribution (p, 1 − p) is,
R = − log2 max{p, 1 − p}, (3)
where
†It is named reliability in [13].
Fig. 1 Visual description of Secure-Operation Margin.
p = − 1
TL
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
bt,l . (4)
2.1.1 Secure-Operation Margin
In [10], the authors proposed a quantitative metric called
Secure-Operation Margin (SOM) for APUF-based authen-
tication. This metric indicates the advantage of legitimate
prover over clone in the number of bits. SOM is defined as
M ′ = kU (1 − S − P), (5)
whereU , S, and P are the uniqueness, the steadiness, and the
prediction rate. The prediction rate indicates the accuracy
of clones. The steadiness means the stability of responses
when the same challenge is repeatedly fed to a PUF. The
steadiness is defined as
S =
1
TL
T∑
t=2
L∑
l=1
(b1,l ⊕ bt,l). (6)
In this paper, we use a slightly modified version of SOM
given by
M = kU (C − P). (7)
In the previous definition in Eq. (5), it is assumed that at
least 50% of CRPs are stable. However, the assumption is
not satisfied in some practical cases. The obstacle can be
avoided in the new definition using C. SOM expresses an
advantage rate of prover in k-bit authentication system as
shown in Fig. 1. kU represents the number of PUF-specific
unique bits found in k responses. Within kU, prover stably
regenerates kUC bits, meanwhile clone successfully predicts
kUP bits. Thus, M , which is given as the difference between
kUC and kUP, is an advantage of prover over clone.
2.2 Double Arbiter PUF
In n-XOR APUF, an arbiter competes two signals from n-
stage selector pairs. Then, n-bit responses from the arbiters
are XORed to generate one-bit response. As an example,
block diagram of 3-XOR APUF with 64 stages is shown in
Fig. 2.
In n-1 DAPUF, propagation time of two signals that
propagate through the wires that are the same in terms of
physical layout are compared. A one-bit response is gener-
ated byXORing the output signals from the arbiters. Figure 2
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Fig. 2 Block diagrams for 3-XOR APUF and 3-1 DAPUF.
Fig. 3 Schematic view of detection circuit for latch-based PUF.
shows a block diagram of 3-1 DAPUF with 64 stages. DA-
PUF can have more arbiters compared to n-XOR APUF,
meanwhile the hardware cost of n-1 DAPUF is almost the
same as that of n-XOR APUF. It should be noted that DA-
PUF has more unreliable responses than APUF [15]. The
unreliability of DAPUF could be a significant problem for
the conventional authentication system.
2.3 Multivalued Responses of PUF
2.3.1 Latch-Based PUF
The authors of [11] proposed a latch-based PUF that outputs
multivalued responses. The latch-based PUF has ternary
outputs, namely 00, 11, and 10, determined by invoking
a raw PUF multiple times. If the responses from the raw
PUF are constantly zero or one, then 00 or 11 is used as
a response. In the remaining case in which the raw PUF
behaves randomly, then the PUF responds with 10. The
translation can be achieved using a simple circuit shown in
Fig. 3.
The authors showed that the latch-based PUF using
ternary is advantageous to conventional ones in which ran-
dom responses had been either corrected using ECC or sim-
ply ignored. It is noted that the latch-based PUF is a weak
PUF used for key (ID) generation. However, its application
to strong PUF inwhichML attack is concernedwas remained
open.
2.3.2 RG-DTM PUF
In [14], response generation according to the delay time
measurement (RG-DTM) PUF that outputs multiple-valued
responses is proposed. In RG-DTM PUF, delay difference
between two paths in APUF is measured more precisely
using an array of capacitors. Therefore, multiple-valued
responses can be assigned to the amount of delay differences.
The authors claim that uniqueness can be improved
by the proposed method. The authors also mention that
resistance against ML attack can be improved by using mul-
tiple classes. However, the number of classes should be
determined before fabrication because delay difference (cf.
unreliability) is used for classification.
3. Proposed Authentication System
3.1 Concept of Q-Class Separation
We proposed a new APUF-based authentication method in-
spired by [11]. In the following discussion, two types of
responses are used. We call the one-bit PUF response as raw
response, whereas the data sent from the prover to the ver-
ifier during authentication is called prover response. Note
that the prover response includes class number as well as
prover’s ID. In the proposed system, the verifier prepares
several classes that are determined by the unreliability of
an underlying APUF. Here, the unreliability indicates how
much unstable raw responses can be for a fixed challenge.
The PUF outputs can be more than ternary depending on the
number of classes, i.e., thresholds on the unreliability.
Suppose that we observe 63 PUF outputs for the same
challenge. Here, we assume that the output of a strong PUF
is 1 bit. Firstly, summation of the 63 outputs is obtained. It
is referred to as rs hereafter. Then, the CRP is classified by
rs . For instance, if the verifier prepares 4 classes:
1. Class 1: rs = 0,
2. Class 2: 1 ≤ rs ≤ 32,
3. Class 3: 33 ≤ rs ≤ 62,
4. Class 4: rs = 63.
Figure 4 shows an example histogram of rs colored by corre-
sponding classes. It is worth noting that the prover is need-
less to know the classification, i.e., the number of thresholds.
Therefore, this authentication system can conceal the accu-
rate unreliability from the attacker.
The proposed method is a certain generalization of the
latch-based PUF [11] in the sense that the number of classes
could be increased from three to any. The increased number
of classes can attribute to improve the security against the
ML attacks. The proposed method is advantageous to RG-
DTM on the point that it does not need special circuit for
measuring delay precisely. Therefore, the proposed method
can be combined with the conventional PUFs. Moreover, the
number of classes as well as thresholds can be determined
after manufacturing.
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3.2 Q-Class Authentication System
The details of the proposed challenge-response authentica-
tion flow are described as follows. Figure 5 illustrates the
flow.
1. Several parameters are determined for the verifier: the
number of classesQ, the ranges of each class depending
on rs , the iteration count of executing PUF mR in mak-
ing CRPs, the number of different challenges required
for authentication k.
2. In the registration phase, the verifier accesses a legiti-
mate PUF to make a table of CRPs and keeps CRPs and
ID of the PUF.
3. In the verification phase, the server chooses a master
challenge from the stored CRPs, and sends it to the
prover (PUF).
4. The prover receives the master challenge, and generates
k challenges from it.
Fig. 4 An example of classification.
Fig. 5 Overview of new authentication system in the verification phase.
5. For each challenge, the prover executes PUF mV times
to derive the corresponding class by counting the num-
ber of 1s in raw responses.
6. The prover sends the prover responses data that contain
k class numbers and ID to the verifier.
7. The verifier compares the prover responses with the
stored data in CRPs, and scores the success rate. Then,
pass/fail is determined by comparing the success ratio
with a threshold.
The verification flow is similar to the conventional PUF-
based challenge-response authentication systems except the
5th process in which PUF raw responses are transferred.
Accordingly, in the 1st process, the verifier determines the
number of classes Q, the ranges of each class depending on
rs , and the iteration count of executing PUF mR in making
CRPs, in addition to the value of k. In the 5th process, the
verifier executes PUF mV times to derive the corresponding
class by counting the number of 1s in raw response. This
process is essential to extend one-bit raw response to the
number of Q.
The ID in the 2nd and 6th steps is an artificial identifi-
cation number and is not generated by PUF. Verifier uses the
ID to select associated CRPs stored in its database and thus
makes 1 : 1 (cf. 1 : n) authentication.
4. Security Evaluations
The security of the proposed authentication scheme is eval-
uated here. We focus on the authentication operations as
described in the previous subsections.
This section is organized as follows. Section 4.1 ex-
plains the experimental setup used for all experiments in
this paper. Section 4.2 describes preliminary experiments,
and Sect. 4.3 explains experiments of Q-class authentica-
tion. Section 4.4 examines the effect of temperature on the
accuracy of authentication.
YASHIRO et al.: Q-CLASS AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM FOR DOUBLE ARBITER PUF
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Fig. 6 Environment for calculating success rate.
Table 2 Measurement result for DAPUF (kU = 256).
2-1 DAPUF 3-1 DAPUF 4-1 DAPUF
Dataset A B C A B C A B C
Correctness [%] 94.7 87.6 88.3 77.0 62.0 73.3 70.0 64.7 62.2
Prediction rate [%] 96.4 84.2 90.0 60.1 60.7 70.2 65.0 58.6 62.9
Uniqueness [%] 73.4 67.3 67.1
Randomness [bit] 0.09 0.64 0.64 0.89 0.90 0.84 0.80 0.94 0.76
SOM [bit] −4 8 −5 43 3 7 12 15 −1
4.1 Experimental Setup
Figure 6 shows an experimental environment. Instances
of an open-source DAPUF implementation [10] are imple-
mented on a Xilinx Virtex-5 Field-Programmable Gate Ar-
ray (FPGA) XC5VLX30. CRPs are collected from the three
FPGAs, and they are referred to as datasets A, B, and C. The
datasets are fed to DL tomake clones. Finally, authentication
test and measurement of success rate are performed.
The attacker collects CRPs from a legitimate PUF, and
uses 50,000 pairs as training data for DL. Pylearn2 is em-
ployed for DL [16]. Parameters necessary for Pylearn2 are
determined by following the previous work [10].
We also use the idea of challenge vector introduced
in [5]. Let cl be the l-th bit of challenge of k bit length. If
cl = 0, and cl = 1 the delay time is represented as δ0l and
δ1
l
, respectively. ~Φ is so-called challenge vector, and it is
expressed as ~Φ(~c) = (Φ1(~c), . . . ,Φd (~c), 1), where Φl (~c) =∏d
i=l (1 − 2ci) for l = 1, . . . , d.
In the training phase, 50,000 CRPs are used to make
a clone of a legitimate PUF. Challenges are applied to the
above expression to make input data for DL. Depending on
the learning data, the clone outputs either raw response or
class number.
4.2 Preliminary Experiment
Table 2 shows quantitative metrics, i.e., correctness, predic-
tion rate, uniqueness, randomness, and SOM for the datasets
A, B, and C. The prediction rate in Table 2 indicates the ratio
of successful predictions by clones over the total predictions.
Here, the parameters for measuring the metrics are T = 64,
L = 10, 000, and N = 3.
The randomness of 2-1 DAPUF are lower than those of
3-1 and 4-1 DAPUFs. In particular, the randomness of 0.089
bits in the dataset A means the most of the raw responses are
either 0 or 1. Randomness of the datasets B and C are better
but still low. The results can be explained by unbalanced
signal delays caused as a result of layout constraints in FPGA.
The value of U relates to the total number of raw re-
sponse needed for authenticating devices appropriately. For
instance, when U is close to 0, the difference of CRPs is
small between PUFs. Therefore, if uniqueness is low, more
CRPs are needed to distinguish PUFs. In addition, if unique-
ness is low, the clone of a legitimate PUF might be able to
attack other PUFs.
In the experiment, kU = 256 is used i.e., the number
of raw responses k = 256/U. The parameter is determined
in order to set effective response length to be 256 bits con-
sidering bits lost by U < 1. SOM is calculated based on the
above parameter. As shown in the SOM row in the table,
cloning is successful when 2-1 DAPUF or 4-1 DAPUF are
used. In contrast, the clones can be distinguished from the
legitimate prover when 3-1 is used.
4.3 Experiments on Q-Class Authentication
The following experiments to evaluate the security of the
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Table 3 Parameter settings used for experiments on 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-class authentication (mR = 63).
Range of raw response value for each class number
mV Q = 2 Q = 3
Class 1 Class 2 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
1 rs = 0 rs = 1 – – –
3 0 ≤ rs ≤ 1 2 ≤ rs ≤ 3 rs = 0 1 ≤ rs ≤ 2 rs = 3
7 0 ≤ rs ≤ 3 4 ≤ rs ≤ 7 rs = 0 1 ≤ rs ≤ 6 rs = 7
15 0 ≤ rs ≤ 7 8 ≤ rs ≤ 15 rs = 0 1 ≤ rs ≤ 14 rs = 15
31 0 ≤ rs ≤ 15 16 ≤ rs ≤ 31 rs = 0 1 ≤ rs ≤ 30 rs = 31
63 0 ≤ rs ≤ 31 32 ≤ rs ≤ 63 rs = 0 1 ≤ rs ≤ 62 rs = 63
Range of raw response value for each class number
mV Q = 4 Q = 5
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5
1 – – – – – – – –
3 rs = 0 rs = 1 rs = 2 rs = 3 – – – – –
7 rs = 0 1 ≤ rs ≤ 3 4 ≤ rs ≤ 6 rs = 7 rs = 0 1 ≤ rs ≤ 2 3 ≤ rs ≤ 4 5 ≤ rs ≤ 6 rs = 7
15 rs = 0 1 ≤ rs ≤ 7 8 ≤ rs ≤ 14 rs = 15 rs = 0 1 ≤ rs ≤ 5 6 ≤ rs ≤ 9 10 ≤ rs ≤ 14 rs = 15
31 rs = 0 1 ≤ rs ≤ 15 16 ≤ rs ≤ 30 rs = 31 rs = 0 1 ≤ rs ≤ 10 11 ≤ rs ≤ 20 21 ≤ rs ≤ 30 rs = 31
63 rs = 0 1 ≤ rs ≤ 31 32 ≤ rs ≤ 62 rs = 63 rs = 0 1 ≤ rs ≤ 21 22 ≤ rs ≤ 41 42 ≤ rs ≤ 62 rs = 63
authentication system are conducted using the following pa-
rameters. In the registration phase, 10,000 different chal-
lenges are used to make CRPs consisting of class numbers.
The thresholds of classification are set as summarized in
Table 3. In the verification phase, 10,000 challenges are
sent from the verifier to the prover. For each challenge, the
prover iterates PUF operations mV times, and answers the
corresponding class based on the number of 1s in the raw
response value rs .
An attacker creates a clone as described in Sect. 4.1.
The quality of clones is evaluated with success rate that is
derived by counting the number of class numbers, which is
the same as the registered class. The success rate is obtained
by dividing the number of prover’s correct answers by 10,000
CRPs.
Cloning attack is considered and evaluated because that
should be the strongest attack for the proposed system. An-
other potential threat is a spoofing attack in which an attacker
replaces a public ID for 1 : 1 authentication thereby convert-
ing a legitimate PUF into another one. The attack succeeds
when a PUF is coincidentally accepted as another PUF. The
resistance against such attack can be evaluated by 1−U when
Q = 2. As shown in Table 2, the predictability by clones are
84%, 60%, 58% for 2-, 3-, and 4-1 DAPUFs, respectively.
They are much higher than corresponding 1 − U that are
27%, 33%, 33%, respectively. The result indicates that the
spoofing attack is less effective compared to cloning attack.
Therefore, the experimental results are evaluated using
success rate. Let AP and AC be the success rate of a prover,
and success rate from an attacker. The difference of success
rate is defined as
D = APQ,mV − max1≤mV ≤63 A
C
Q,mV
. (8)
The maximum AC
Q,mV
is used considering the most suc-
cessful clones for strict security evaluation. As D becomes
higher, authentication errors i.e., false acceptance or false
rejection become smaller. Because success rate indicates
the average rate of correct responses, the number of correct
responses goes up and down. In general, when the thresh-
old is set high, false rejection increases. In contrast, false
acceptance increases when the threshold is set low. If D is
large, it is possible to set a threshold that might not occur
authentication error.
Figure 7 shows the success rates, and Table 4 summa-
rizes the success rate difference D between the legitimate
prover (PUF) and the attacker (clone) for the datasets A, B,
and C from DAPUF.
WhenQ = 2,Q-class authentication system is the same
as that using conventional DAPUF. Therefore, success rate
is almost flat even when mV is increased as shown in Fig. 7.
In 3-class authentication, there is a bias in the total num-
ber of raw responses in each class when using 3-1 DAPUF
and 4-1 DAPUF. That is because 3-1 DAPUF and 4-1 DA-
PUF have numerous unstable raw responses. DL predicts
efficiently when the ratio between the classes is biased. The
success rates increase by mV with a few exceptions. When
using 2-1 DAPUF, D is larger compared to that of Q = 2.
However, in the case of 3-1 DAPUF and 4-1 DAPUF,D does
not become larger as expected, since the clone’s success rate
is higher.
For Q = 4, D is improved in comparison to that with
Q = 2. When using 2-1 DAPUF and 3-1 DAPUF, D in-
creases slightly as shown in Table 4. Furthermore, the dif-
ferences of the success rates D are 41%, 44%, and 36%
for datasets A, B, and C, respectively, when using 4-1 DA-
PUF. In addition,D increases by 10% compared to that with
Q = 2, because the number of raw responses are uniform in
each class. In other words, the chance to get correct response
becomes low if the number of classes increased.
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Fig. 7 Success rate of Q-class authentication using 2-1, 3-1, and 4-1 DAPUF for different iteration
counts, mV of executing PUF in verification (mR = 63).
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Table 4 The difference of success rate D (mV =63).
Dataset (Q) 2-1 DAPUF 3-1 DAPUF 4-1 DAPUF
A (2) 1.6 35.5 29.3
A (3) 4.0 35.5 31.7
A (4) 3.6 35.8 40.9
A (5) 3.3 32.2 38.3
B (2) 13.1 30.8 32.6
B (3) 20.3 24.3 29.8
B (4) 21.4 39.4 44.1
B (5) 19.4 39.8 43.5
C (2) 6.8 22.8 23.7
C (3) 10.6 26.4 28.4
C (4) 12.1 36.1 35.5
C (5) 11.8 35.2 33.3
For Q = 5, both the first and second terms of D, i.e.,
APQ,mV and max1≤mV ≤63 A
C
Q,mV
become smaller because
more misclassifications are observed. The first term de-
creases more rapidly, and thusD is smaller compared to that
with Q = 4. In summary, improvement in resistance against
ML attack comes at the cost of misclassification. In some
cases, the degradation of APQ,mV is larger than the degrada-
tion of the max1≤mV ≤63 ACQ,mV as with Q = 5. Therefore, it
is important to choose an appropriateQ in order to maximize
the performance of the authentication system.
When increasing the value of Q, it becomes more dif-
ficult to break the authentication system as shown in Fig. 7.
However, when the value of Q is increased too much, the
unreliability of the raw responses would be known to the
attacker. Such unreliability can be used for an attack in [7].
Altogether, there is a strong relationship between the number
of Q and the clone’s ability.
Figure 7 shows the clone accuracy does not increase
significantly by the value of mV .
As Fig. 7 shows,the resistance against DL-attack does
not improve even if Q is increased when using 2-1 DA-
PUF. For this reason, the prover’s advantage difference is not
higher. It is reported that 3-1 DAPUF is more suitable for
challenge-response authentication than 2- or 4-1 DAPUFs
in [10]. In case of 3-1 DAPUF, there is a case in which Q
does not make significant change (see dataset A in Table 4).
In contrast,D of 4-1 DAPUF are improved by 10% in all the
datasets when Q is changed from 2 to 4. This is presumably
because the correctness of 4-1 DAPUF is lower than 2- or
3-1 DAPUF. To sum up, Q-class authentication is tended to
suitable for unstable PUF.
4.4 Change of Temperature
DAPUF outputs a lot of unstable raw responses. Accord-
ingly, it is necessary to evaluate performance under various
environments. One of the factors of authentication accuracy
is authentication environment, i.e., temperature of FPGA
boards. This experiment uses 4-1 DAPUF that becomes the
most unstable in the case of mV = 63. The success rates of
provers are measured under different temperatures.
Table 5 The success rate of environmental change (mV = 63).
class temp. prover clone
(Q) [◦C] A B C A B C
5 86.22 83.79 83.29 62.13 58.62 64.72
room 91.92 91.2 88.72 60.19 59.34 70.06
2 50 86.35 88.31 87.07 62.20 58.32 65.16
70 61.78 72.89 66.31 42.81 48.2 62.45
5 81.71 82.59 79.88 56.89 60.31 56.81
room 89.82 90.32 85.90 56.13 66.04 64.88
3 50 84.44 87.50 82.77 56.96 60.76 57.43
70 56.20 72.64 62.27 18.87 54.43 54.60
5 69.07 67.20 65.29 40.77 36.83 39.27
room 81.75 81.54 75.83 51.84 42.46 47.87
4 50 71.50 75.98 71.28 40.26 37.32 39.11
70 36.62 54.07 42.46 18.76 28.28 32.19
5 62.51 59.66 58.52 37.39 32.05 34.75
room 76.23 75.58 69.62 37.90 32.08 36.30
5 50 64.75 69.05 64.3 37.55 32.32 36.28
70 30.22 46.85 34.41 19.24 22.84 25.29
Table 5 shows the experimental result when changing
temperature of FPGA. The room temperature is around from
24◦C to 28◦C. Then, the boards are exposed to environments
with 5◦C, 50◦C, and 70◦C. The environment of less than 5◦C
and over 50◦C is realized by using a cold storage chamber
or a heat gun, respectively. Meanwhile the temperature is
monitored using a thermocouple. Note that the tempera-
tures measured on the surface of the FPGA chip are 0– 6◦C,
49–58◦C, and 69–77◦C, respectively in reality. When the
temperature is changed, the success rate decreases, because
the number of unstable raw responses increases.
The FPGA boards do not work due to communication
failure from −17◦C to −10◦C. In other words, the raw re-
sponses could not be obtained since the communication of
FPGA boards was not performed. When the temperature
is in the range between 5◦C and 50◦C, the success rates
of provers are higher than those of clones, thus the verifier
can set a threshold to distinguish the prover from the clone.
When the temperature is higher than 70◦C, PUFs sometimes
did not operate normally. If the temperature is over 80◦C,
PUFs did not work, and the raw responses become all the
same even if the given challenges are random.
Among the success rates of clone A for 2- and 3-class at
5◦C or 50◦C and clone B for 5-class at 50◦C, no significant
difference is observed. The clone’s success rate does not in-
crease by changing temperature, thusD at room temperature
does not decrease any further.
Furthermore,the success rates of the prover decreases
when the temperature of FPGA boards are changed. Al-
though, the prover’s success rates are higher than those of
clones. Therefore, it would not become a serious threat to
authentication.
5. Conclusions and Future Works
This study proposed a new authentication system that uses
the Q-class separation of raw response values. The exper-
imental evaluation of Q-class authentication using DAPUF
(for Q = 3, 4, 5) revealed that the proposed authentication
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system enhanced ML tolerance compared to the conven-
tional scheme. In particular, when using 4-1 DAPUF, the
difference between the prover and the clone increases more
effectively. The authentication system accuracy might be
unaffected by temperature changes from 5 to 50◦C.
In future work, we will evaluate various PUF primitives
that are considered difficult to use in a conventional authen-
tication system because of the unreliable raw responses.
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